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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
LABOR RELATIONS-PUBLIC
THEIR SCHOOL BOARD

STRIKE ARE ILLEGAL.-In

N.E.2d 427 (1965),

EMPLOYEES-STRIKING BY JANITORS AGAINST

EMPLOYER

AND PICKETING IN SUPPORT OF SUCH

A

Board of Education v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207

the Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted with

the problems of whether custodial employees of a local school board could
strike against their employer, and whether they could picket in support
of such a strike. The court held that public employees could not legally
strike against their employer, and that picketing in support of this strike
was unlawful.
The custodial force of the plaintiff school board was affiliated with
both the local and national Chauffeurs and Helpers Union. On August 3,
1964, the union officers presented a proposed collective bargaining agreement on behalf of its thirteen members which was refused by the school
board. On September 2, a school day, the custodians failed to show up for
work but set up picket lines with the union's assistance at each of the
seven schools operated by plaintiff. The picketing was carried on for
the next eight days with normal operations disrupted,' resulting finally
in the closing of the schools on September 8 through September 10.

A complaint for injunctive relief having been filed on September 8,
a preliminary hearing was held on September 10, but the injunction was
not granted. A statement was, however, issued by the court to the effect
that both parties desired that the schools should reopen, that full attendance was encouraged, and that the defendants could continue peaceful
picketing. The picketing was, in fact, continued, resulting in further disruption of normal school operations. 2 On September 24, in further hear-

ing on the matter, the circuit court of Bond County refused to enjoin
either the strike or the picketing, holding that the plaintiff failed to show
irreparable injury, that the picketing was peaceful and a valid exercise
of the constitutional right of free speech, and that no danger of interference with the operation of the schools existed.
The plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois since
questions arising under the federal and state constitutions were involved. 8
1 Attendance figures were below normal, milk and bread deliveries were not made
due to the failure of deliverymen to cross picket lines, the schools were not cleaned,
repairs to the roof of one school were not made, and student transportation was affected.
Board of Education v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
2 Cleaning had to be performed by volunteers resulting in substandard cleanliness,
the furnaces were not fired nor were hot water heaters operated, and the principals
and administrative staff were forced to perform maintenance duties. Board of Education
v. Redding, supra note 1.
3 Ill. Const. art. VI, § 5. "Appeals from the judgments of circuit courts shall lie
directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right . . . in cases involving a question
arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State ....
"
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On appeal, the court reversed and remanded with directions to issue an
injunction restraining both the strike and picketing in support of the
strike. The court reasoned that there was no inherent right in the defendants to strike against their government employer, and that such a
strike, for any purpose, was illegal and could be enjoined. Furthermore,
picketing in support of a purpose unlawful under state laws or policies
could be restrained without abridging the right of free speech.
The plaintiff's prime contention was that the strike and picketing
interfered with the constitutional duty of the General Assembly "to provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools.
...
4 The case being
one of first impression in Illinois, the court relied heavily on the decisions
of other courts. In agreeing with the plaintiff's contention, the court cited
the following from a Rhode Island case, City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket
Teacher's A lliance: 5
Under provisions of article XII of the state constitution,
education is a state function. As such it is administered and
carried out by cities and towns through their school committees,
as agencies of the state government . . . . [T]eachers . . . are,
therefore, agents of the sovereign power.
Furthermore, in support of the theory that there is no inherent right
in municipal employees to strike against their governmental employer, the
court in Norwalk Teacher's Association v. Board of Education6 said:
In the American system, sovereignty is inherent in the people.
They can delegate it to a government which they create and operate by law. They can give to that government the power and
authority to perform certain duties and furnish certain services.
The government so created and empowered must employ people
to carry on its task. These people are agents of the government.
They exercise some part of the sovereignty entrusted to it. They
occupy a status entirely different from those who carry on a private
enterprise. They serve the public welfare and not a private purpose. To say that they can strike is the equivalent of saying that
they can deny the authority of government and contravene the
public welfare.
The basis for the policy set forth in the City of Pawtucket and Norwalk
Teacher's Association cases was that governmental functions may not be
impeded or obstructed and that, since the profit motive is lacking in
government, there can be no conflict between the employer and em7
ployees for a greater share of the profits.
Justice Daily, in applying the reasoning of the above cases to the
4 Ill. Const. art. VIII, § 1. The general assembly shall provide a thorough and
efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a good
common school education.
5 87 R.I. 364, 371, 141 A.2d 624, 627-8 (1958).
6 138 Conn. 269, 276, 83 A.2d 482, 485 (1951).
7 See generally Sullivan, Labor Problems In Public Employment, 41 111. B.J. 432 (1953).
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situation presented in the Redding case, stated that under the Illinois
constitution, a duty was imposed upon those who became agents of the
government to fulfill the will of the people to refrain from conduct which
will render schools less efficient and thorough.8 The defendants, therefore, as agents of the local board of education were under a duty to refrain
from such conduct.
While admitting that a strike by teachers would be illegal, the defendants nevertheless contended that janitors were not bound by the
same restrictions. Though not set forth in the case, the reasoning for
this contention was evidently that, in failing to perform their custodial
functions, the schools would not be rendered any less efficient or thorough.
Justice Daily, however, stated that janitors were not to be accorded different
treatment than teachers with respect to a strike by either. Providing heat,
sanitation, proper building repairs, lunch and transportation for students,
and keeping teachers free from the performance of distracting functions
are all matters essential to the efficient operation of the schools, and the
defendants, in failing to perform these functions, were impeding and obstructing the normal functioning of the plaintiff's schools in disregard of
the duty imposed upon them under Article 8 of the Illinois constitution.
The defendants further contended that they offered to perform their
duties, and those who didn't cross the picket lines did so of their own
volition. Justice Daily, however, found that the governmental function
was being impeded, and stated ". . . [T]o be efficient, school operations
cannot depend on the choice or whim of employees, or their union, or
others; both must be controlled only by duly constituted and qualified officials."9
The defendants claimed that picketing is a valid exercise of free
speech under the state and federal constitutions, and when done in a
peaceful and truthful manner may not be regulated or enjoined. The
Supreme Court of the United States first recognized that picketing contained elements of free speech protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution in the case of Thornhill v. Alabama,'"
wherein the Court reversed a conviction under an Alabama statute prohibiting picketing or loitering. The Court therein stated that freedom of
speech and of press embraced the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. It regarded the dissemination of information concerning facts of a labor dispute as within the area of free discussion
guaranteed by the Constitution."
Board of Education v. Redding, 32 Il1. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
at 573, 207 N.E.2d at 431.
10 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).
8

9 Id.

11 Ibid.
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However, in Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe,12 the
Court, in affirming the granting of an injunction by a Texas court restraining union members from picketing, stated that while the constitutional right to communicate is not lost merely because a labor dispute is
involved or because picketing is the method of communication utilized,
the freedom of expression is not given any greater constitutional sanction
because a labor dispute is the occasion of exercising that freedom, nor is
it rendered inviolable. Furthermore, in Hughes v. Superior Court of California,13 picketing, though recognized as a mode of communication, was
said to be inseparably more and different.
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality, and since the very
presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another,
quite irrespective
of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.' 4
The Court went on to say in the Hughes case that a state could restrain
picketing without abridging the right of free speech where the protection
of the public interest and property rights was necessary, and where such
picketing was for an unlawful purpose as declared by the judicial or
legislative organs of the state. 15
On the strength of the above decisions, Justice Daily reasoned that
since the picketing carried on by the defendants was in support of an unlawful activity, striking, it should be enjoined.
No attempt was made in this case to distinguish between governmental and proprietary functions with respect to the right of public
employees to strike against their employer. It has been argued that public
employees acting in a proprietary function of the government should be
accorded the same rights and privileges as employees working in private
enterprise, 16 but other courts have countered this argument by reasoning
that where the performance of a municipal and public function by a
governmental employer is involved, irrespective of whether it is acting in
a proprietary or governmental capacity, employment in the public service
requires the surrender of certain civil rights to a limited extent.' 7
In summary, the Illinois Supreme Court has clearly decided that
315 U.S. 722, 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (1942).
339 U.S. 460, 70 Sup. Ct. 718 (1950).
14 Id. at 464-5, 70 Sup. Ct. at 721, citing from Bakery and Pastry Drivers Union v.
Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775-6, 62 Sup. Ct. 816, 819 (1942). See generally Teller, Picketing and
Free Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180 (1943).
15 Id. at 460, 70 Sup. Ct. at 718.
16 Miami Waterworks Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946)
(dissenting opinion).
17 City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trade Council, 94
Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949).
12
13
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public employees, even those in positions not peculiarly governmental,
have no right to strike against their employer nor to picket in support of
such a strike, a decision bound to have a restrictive affect on future
attempts to strike by public employees. While public employees may still
make grievances known to their employer through their union, this decision does indicate that perhaps the only effective means available to
public employee unions of enforcing their demands for better working
conditions and salaries is through organized efforts to effect legislation
in their interests.
ROBERT J. JOHNSON

EQuITY-INJUNCTION-UNVERIFIED

COMPLAINT

HELD

INSUFFICIENT

TO

SUPPORT A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ORDER.-In Phelan v. Wright, 54 Ill.

App. 2d 178, 203 N.E.2d 587 (1st Dist. 1964), the Illinois Appellate.Court
was confronted with the problem of whether an unverified complaint, not
supported by a verified petition or affidavit, was sufficient to support the
issuance of a temporary injunction. The court held that it was an abuse
of the trial court's discretion to issue a temporary injunction on an unverified complaint.
In the Phelan case, the plaintiffs filed their unverified complaint for
an injunction, alleging that the defendant was in violation of certain
provisions of a partnership agreement, to which the defendant was a
party. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
After hearing arguments of counsel on the merits of defendant's
motion to dismiss, the trial court denied the motion and ordered that the
temporary injunction issue. The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal
to the Illinois Appellate Court. On Appeal, held: Reversed. Verification
is a fudamental requirement for a complaint seeking a temporary injunction and defendant's motion to dismiss neither disposed of this requirement nor amounted to a waiver of it. The court reasoned that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion and in issuing the
temporary injunction.
It has long been settled that the granting of temporary injunctions
is largely a matter of the trial court's discretion,' and that great caution
must be exercised. 2 The reviewing court must consequently determine
whether the trial court properly exercised its discretionary powers. In the
1 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Vee Jay Records, Inc., 47 Ill. App. 2d 468, 197 N.E.2d 503
(lst Dist. 1964); H.K.H. Development Corp. v. The Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Chicago,
47 Il1. App. 2d 46, 196 N.E.2d 494 (1st Dist. 1964); Weingart v. Weingart, 23 Ill. App. 2d
154, 161 N.E.2d 714 (1st Dist. 1959).
2 Peterson v. Domestic Utility Services Co., 33 Ill. App. 2d 374, 179 N.E.2d 444 (lst
Dist. 1961).

